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Background: Providing food through schools has well documented effects in terms of the education, health and
nutrition of school children. However, there is limited evidence in terms of the benefits of providing a reliable
market for small-holder farmers through “home-grown” school feeding approaches. This study aims to evaluate the
impact of school feeding programmes sourced from small-holder farmers on small-holder food security, as well as
on school children’s education, health and nutrition in Mali. In addition, this study will examine the links between
social accountability and programme performance.
Design: This is a field experiment planned around the scale-up of the national school feeding programme,
involving 116 primary schools in 58 communities in food insecure areas of Mali. The randomly assigned
interventions are: 1) a school feeding programme group, including schools and villages where the standard
government programme is implemented; 2) a “home-grown” school feeding and social accountability group,
including schools and villages where the programme is implemented in addition to training of community based
organisations and local government; and 3) the control group, including schools and household from villages
where the intervention will be delayed by at least two years, preferably without informing schools and households.
Primary outcomes include small-holder farmer income, school participation and learning, and community
involvement in the programme. Other outcomes include nutritional status and diet-diversity. The evaluation will
follow a mixed method approach, including household, school and village level surveys as well as focus group
discussions with small-holder farmers, school children, parents and community members. The impact evaluation will
be incorporated within the national monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system strengthening activities that are
currently underway in Mali. Baselines surveys are planned for 2012. A monthly process monitoring visits, spot
checks and quarterly reporting will be undertaken as part of the regular programme monitoring activities.
Evaluation surveys are planned for 2014.
Discussion: National governments in sub-Saharan Africa have demonstrated strong leadership in the response to
the recent food and financial crises by scaling-up school feeding programmes. “Home-grown” school feeding
programmes have the potential to link the increased demand for school feeding goods and services to
community-based stakeholders, including small-holder farmers and women’s groups. Alongside assessing the more
traditional benefits to school children, this evaluation will be the first to examine the impact of linking school food
service provision to small-holder farmer income, as well as the link between community level engagement and
programme performance.
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Today, every country for which we have information is
seeking to provide food, in some way and at some scale,
to its schoolchildren. However, where the need is
greatest, in terms of hunger, poverty and poor social
indicators, the programmes tend to be the smallest. Past
experience shows that countries do not seek to exit from
providing food to their schoolchildren, but rather to
transition from externally supported projects to
nationally-owned programmes [1]. Countries that have
made a successful transition have often explored linking
school feeding programmes to agriculture development
– an approach also known as “Home Grown School
Feeding” (HGSF) [2].
Strategic leadership from the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) guided Governments in
Sub-Saharan Africa to include HGSF as a key intervention
within the food security pillar of the Comprehensive Af-
rica Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)
framework. Several countries, including Cote d’Ivoire,
Ghana, Kenya, Mali and Nigeria are already implementing
national programmes. From this perspective, HGSF
provides an integrated framework with multiple impacts
across agriculture, health, nutrition and education [3].
Since early 2008, the World Bank Group, World Food
Programme (WFP) and the Partnership for Child Devel-
opment (PCD) have been working together to help
governments develop and implement cost effective, sus-
tainable, national school feeding programs.
How best can the potential of school feeding be
maximised to support multi-sectoral integrated frameworks
linking agriculture, health, nutrition and education? Can
HGSF be a win-win for agriculture, education and health?
There is a need to answer these questions operationally and
build the evidence base to help policy makers manage the
trade-offs across the multiple school feeding objectives [4].
This paper develops the design of a field experiment of
the HGSF programme in Mali, with baselines planned
for 2012.
Mali country context
Mali is, according to the Food and Agricultural
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) definition, a
Low-Income Food Deficit Country (LIFDC) with a
population of 14 million people, over half of whom are
under 15 years of age. According to the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), Mali is ranked 178th
in the Human Development Index table, with an average
life expectancy at birth of 48 years, adult literacy rate of
26 percent and a gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita (PPP) of $1,083 USD. At a country level, Mali has
seen remarkable progress in terms of access to school
(net enrolment ratios increased from 20% in 1990 to
66% in 2007) but the levels of enrolment are still wellbelow the average for Sub-Saharan Africa and comple-
tion rates are very poor1. A large proportion of children,
girls in particular, are excluded from the schooling sys-
tem. There are also large disparities within Mali; in the
regions of Koulikoro and Mopti, for example, girls’ en-
rolment was estimated at 44% in 2005 [5].
Agricultural productivity in Mali is among the lowest
in the world [6]. In Mali, the majority of farmers are
involved in the production of food crops, with the main
cereals being millet and sorghum. Production is carried
out using a low level of technology: fertiliser use is min-
imal and access to credit is limited. Crop yields are not
only low but also highly variable due to the fact that
most farmers depend on rain-fed farming while rainfall
fluctuates considerably from year to year and season to
season [6].
According to the 2005 WFP food security and vulner-
ability analysis, an estimated 4 million people, or 40% of
the population live in food insecurity or are highly vul-
nerable to food insecurity. According to this assessment,
the regions most at risk are Kayes, Koulikoro, Mopti,
Tombouctou, Gao and Kidal. The food security assess-
ment also showed that food access is a primary con-
straint: food is available at markets when harvests are
good but populations face constraints in food access and
utilisation.
Thirty-eight percent of children under five years of age
are chronically malnourished or stunted in their growth
(low height for age), 15% are acutely malnourished or
wasted (low weight for height), and 27% are underweight
(low weight for age), which is a composite measure of
stunting and wasting2. The majority (81%) of children 6
to 59 months of age are anaemic3, caused mainly by iron
deficiency, malaria and helminth infections. Anaemia
prevalence in school-age children is lower but still un-
acceptably high with 56% of school children affected [7].
Thirty-seven percent of five year olds, when they will
soon be entering primary school, are stunted in their
growth and eight percent are wasted.
Design of the intervention
The interventions involve school feeding implemented
by the government of Mali. The national programme
was launched in 2009 and currently targets 651 schools
located mainly in the 166 most vulnerable communes
(official data report that currently 10% of the 9,400 pri-
mary schools in the country have a school canteen run
by the state or by partners, including WFP and Catholic
Relief Services (CRS)). The targets of the school feeding
intervention are public primary schools of rural villages
and children attending these schools. Compulsory basic
education in Mali is composed of six years of primary
and three years of lower secondary. The schooling age
for primary is 7 to 12 and it is 13 to 15 for lower
Masset and Gelli Trials 2013, 14:55 Page 3 of 23
http://www.trialsjournal.com/content/14/1/55secondary. Considering the high repetition rate (15 to
20%), early and delayed entrants, and uncertainties and
misreporting of age, the target group of intervention
consists of children aged 5 to 17 and their families.
The national school feeding programme in Mali
In line with the National Decentralisation Policy and the
2009 National School Feeding Policy, programme imple-
mentation is decentralised to the community level, in-
volving the communes and School Management
Committees (CGS). The central government allocated
nearly 5 million USD (2.6 billion CFA) in 2010 and 5.8
million USD in 2011 (3.1 billion CFA) from the national
budget for food, cooking equipment and infrastructure
rehabilitation and construction [8]. Funds are channelled
directly through the Ministry of Finance to its Regional
Offices which in turn send funds to the communes.
Food commodities are procured from local markets by
the communes or by the CGS. To date, there is no fixed
food basket nor fixed ration specification. The budget
allocated for food procurement is based on student en-
rolment figures obtained by the Ministry of Education
and price estimates for staples at the beginning of the
school year. The budget covers staples, including cereals
and pulses and oil. Fresh vegetables to complement the
school feeding ration are contributed by parents and the
community through cash or in-kind contributions.
Cooks are generally organised on a voluntary basis (also
considered as the contribution to the program from the
community) through the CGS.
Food provision consists of a school lunch meal served
at noon (school is from 8 am to 12 am and then again
from 3 pm to 5 pm). The food mainly consists of staples
(rice, millet or sorghum) enriched with condiments,
vegetables, vitamins and minerals depending on theMayors
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Figure 1 Stylised food procurement process in the national programmsource of provision. Figure 1 captures the key activities
in the food procurement process currently in use in the
national programme. Enrolment figures are collected by
the Centres d’ Animation Pedagogicue (CAP), the
equivalent of district education offices, through the CGS
and passed on to the mayors to estimate the food
requirements for school feeding. Mayors receive budgets
from the Ministry of Finance on the basis of the enrol-
ment/food requirements, then issue tenders, on the basis
of a credit advance, to certified service providers
(traders) to procure the food. The service providers
(traders) then purchase the food from the market or
from small-holders, and deliver it to the relevant
schools.
Mayors are public officials representing the democrat-
ically elected local authority within each commune. The
office of the Mayor is responsible for the food procure-
ment in all the relevant schools in the commune.
The purchase of food by mayors presents a number of
problems [9]:
 Food is mostly purchased from traders rather than
from small-holder farmers
 Food purchased by mayors is often unrelated to
food habits of the beneficiary communities; it does
not follow any specific nutritional advice, and its
quality is uncertain
 Food is delivered to communities with delays and
CGS are uncertain about deliveries
 Food can be easily in excess or deficit of needs
because it is purchased based on rough estimates of
enrolment (with low enrolment rates the margin of
error can be large and the programme has the effect
of increasing enrolment which is not accounted for
in the allocation)4CAP
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An innovative capacity-building component will be
integrated alongside the national school feeding
programme and will constitute one of the treatment
arms of the experiment (see Figure 2). The HGSF pilot
intends to promote purchases from small farmers
through training, monitoring and communication activ-
ities among the actors involved. Mayors and CAPs will
be instructed, and encouraged, to involve small farmers
in the transactions. Currently, mayors purchase food
from one or more traders following government
guidelines regarding contracts and bidding processes.
Under the project, and in coordination with the Ministry
of Agriculture, mayors and traders will be requested to
enforce the purchase of food from local producers at
least at a minimum percentage. On the other hand, the
CGSs will be assigned the task of identifying local
suppliers, possibly at the village level, and of establishing
contacts between these suppliers and the traders.
A working group composed of in-country stake-
holders, including the Dutch Cooperation Agency
(SNV), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), and WFP is cur-
rently working on the details of the package of “soft-
ware” interventions to improve overall programme
performance. This package will include:
 Training of mayors and CAPS. At the beginning of
each school year a number of training events will be
organised for Commune-level stakeholders,
including mayors and CAP. The purpose of the
training events is to improve service delivery on
several accounts:Mayors
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Figure 2 Stylised food procurement process in the HGSF+ programme.◦ The establishment of a monitoring system of
programme activities
◦ The identification of formulas for the allocation of
food to schools (currently the allocation is based on
rough enrolment estimates, but enrolment is
endogenous as it is driven by food provision, hence
a flexible system of funds and food allocation based
on ‘predicted’ enrolment needs to be put in place.)
◦ The illustration of methodologies for purchasing
from smallholder farmers rather than from traders
(formulation of bids, contracts, contingency plans
and so on)
◦Nutrition education and the importance of adequate
nutrition for school children and smallholder
farmers, for example, how to use the foods they
grow or purchase to improve the nutritional status
of all family members, including diet
diversification, availability of staple and nutrient
rich foods by season, food storage and safety, food
processing and preparation.
 Training of CGS. Training events for CGS at the
village level will be held periodically, on a monthly
or quarterly basis, in every intervention village:
◦Members of CGS will be given the instruments to
efficiently implement the programme including
basic accountancy skills, information on their rights
and entitlements, and information on methods to
raise complaints
◦ Participatory monitoring events will be periodically
held at the village level. +Members of CGS, parentent
CAP
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Enrolment
/food requirements
Training
Training
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involved in participatory events where the
programme performance will be monitored in close
detail, suggestions for improvement will be
proposed and complaints brought to the attention of
project staff and CAPs.
◦Nutrition education and the importance of adequate
nutrition for school children and smallholder
farmers, for example, how to use the foods they
grow or purchase to improve the nutritional status
of all family members, including diet
diversification, availability of staple and nutrient
rich foods by season, food storage and safety, food
processing and preparation.Programme theory of the intervention
School feeding interventions linked to small-holder agri-
culture can have multiple goals in the following areas:
 Food security: supporting incomes of recipient
households (those consuming food) and farmer
households (those providing the food)
 Education: increasing school enrolment, attendance
and reducing drop-out, and improving cognition
and learning achievement
 Health: improving nutritional status of school age
children
The impact of the intervention in each of the above
areas occurs through a number of complex pathways.
This section describes the pathways through which the
programme is expected to operate. Though the evalu-
ation of all potential effects of the intervention is beyond
the scope of this study, a subset of outcome indicators
for the evaluation will be selected based on: a) a know-
ledge gap specific to school feeding in Mali; b) know-
ledge gaps in the school feeding literature in general; c)School feeding
H
(nu
Food security
(inc. agriculture)
a
b
c
re 3 Overall programme theory of school feeding interventions.feedback from peer reviewers and technical partners;
and d) budget constraints.
Figure 3 illustrates in very broad terms the impact the-
ory of school feeding on food security, education and
health. School feeding affects educational outcomes dir-
ectly by increasing enrolment, attendance and comple-
tion (line ‘a’ in the figure). It affects health directly by
improving nutritional status (line ‘b’), this in turn has an
indirect impact on education, as improving nutritional
status has a positive impact on learning outcomes (line
‘d’). The intervention can also affect income directly by
increasing households’ food security (line ‘c’). Finally,
there are effects running through increased income,
health and nutrition, and vice versa, as richer families
are investing more in human capital and more educated
and healthier adults are more economically productive.
However, these latter effects only occur in the long term
and certainly not before children have left school; there-
fore, we will not discuss them in the following design.
It must be emphasised that the ability of the school
feeding intervention to deliver the effects depicted in
Figure 3 critically depends on the appropriate implemen-
tation of the programme. The management and imple-
mentation of the intervention involves several actors and
scoping visits. A preliminary study undertaken by PCD
[9] has shown that in Mali there are several problems of
communication, supervision and monitoring among
these different stakeholders. Programme success will also
depend on the ability of communities to actively engage
in the programme and in the strengthening of the public
institutions involved. The issues of social accountability,
‘good governance’ and the links between accountability
and programme effectiveness are important areas that
this impact evaluation will explore in more detail.
Impact on food security and smallholder agriculture
The intervention is designed to stimulate the economy
at a community level by purchasing food from small-Education
ealth 
trition)
d
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is currently purchased from traders by mayors of the
Communes of intervention. Traders in turn purchase
food from small-holder producers, though these do not
need to be residents of the villages targeted by the pro-
ject. The capacity building or HGSF+ component
supported by PCD is intended to confer the community-
based organisation more decision power and will in-
crease their ability to purchase from individual farmers
or farmers’ associations residing in the project villages.
On the small-holder farmer production side the
programme can have three main effects that are
summarised in Table 1 and schematically in Figure 4, in-
cluding output effects, distributional effects and stabil-
isation effects. In addition to these effects, the
programme can also have some wider effects on the
local economy by generating employment.
The programme introduces additional demand on the
market. In Mali, the school feeding programme
purchases food for schools at the Commune level, which
includes several villages. Most Communes have food
markets. Mayors purchase from traders in the com-
mune. Traders in turn purchase food from, among other
sources, small-holder farmers. The effect of the food
purchases is a shift of the demand curve for food (say
rice) to the right (movement from D0 to D1), as
illustrated in Figure 5.
The size of the shift depends on the extent of the
substitution effects and on the size of the market
considered. Substitution occurs when households reduce
the domestic consumption of food because children are
fed in school. At one extreme, there is full substitution:
families do not provide any additional food to children
fed in school or any other household member in excess
of the school food ration. Food provided in school en-
tirely substitutes for food normally consumed in the
home. The result is an increase in household savings
and consumption of non-food items. In this case, there
is no shift of the demand function (D0) and HGSF does
not have price or output effects. There is still a distribu-
tional effect of the intervention if food is purchased from
small-holders rather than large farmers. Profits of large
farmers will in this case decrease whilst profits of small-
holder farmers increase. Full substitution, however, is
unlikely to occur. The largest substitution is likely to
occur when households interpret the school food ration
as a cash transfer. In this, theoretical, case the incomeTable 1 Programme impact on smallholder farmers
Effects Impact on smallholder
Output effects Increase in farm profits
Distributional effects Increase in farm profits
Stabilisation effects Risk reductionequivalent of the ration is spent following income elasti-
cities. Considering that the areas of intervention are very
poor, assuming an income elasticity of food of 0.6 to 0.8
and a food share of 0.8, we understand that only about
half of the HGSF transfer would eventually be spent on
food and the food demand function shifts to D*. How-
ever, studies show that rarely do people interpret food
transfers as cash transfers and that people tend to attach
some preference to the food received and thus consum-
ing food beyond what the income elasticities would
suggest. Therefore, the final shift in the demand curve
is likely to happen somewhere between the curves D*
and D1.
The size of the demand shift also depends on the size
of the market considered. If we are considering the na-
tional rice market, the shift is extremely small and the
price and output effects are likely to be negligible [10].
The effect is larger at the commune level if food is
procured locally. However, some of the food may be
purchased outside the commune and, therefore, the shift
of the demand function at the commune level would be
smaller than the one depicted in Figure 5.
The impact of HGSF on output and prices at the com-
mune level will depend on the slopes of the demand and
supply functions (see Figure 6). Welfare effects on
producers and consumers can be calculated using changes
in consumer and producer surpluses. We do not know the
values of the supply and demand elasticities of food items,
which need to be estimated econometrically. For conveni-
ence, we consider constant elasticities around the equilib-
rium point (a logarithmic form provides this type of
elasticity ln(q) = a + bln(p) + cln(y).
Consumer surplus is the area between the market
equilibrium price line (Pe) and the demand curve (D0).
Producer surplus is the area between the market equilib-
rium price line (Pe) and the supply curve (S). Producers’
and consumers’ surpluses can be calculated provided we
know the initial equilibrium price level (Pe), the quan-
tities of food produced and consumed at this price, and
the own price elasticity of food demand (the shape of
the demand and supply curves).
Two extreme cases of small and large supply elastici-
ties are shown in Figure 7. The size of supply elasticity
will depend on three main factors, such as yield risk,
market failures and rigidity of fixed factors. High income
risk and missing markets are likely to be present in the
communes of intervention, thus reducing the size offarmers Spill-over effects
Increase in consumer prices
Decrease in large farmers’ profits
none
Agricultural output
-Profits= Price Quantity - Costs
Substitution
“How much of the demand is 
additional on the market?”
-household food consumption
Risk
-investments in production technology
-specialisation
Household income
-distribution/welfare effects
Small holder farmers
Traders
-% procured from small holders
Mayors
Figure 4 Programme theory of school feeding and smallholder agriculture.
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promptly to price changes. In addition, while farmers
may be able to vary the amount of variable inputs used
(labour and fertiliser, for example), they might not be
able to change the amount of fixed input in the short
run (such as, equipment, land and livestock).
The two supply curves in Figure 7 can be seen as
short- and long-term supply curves or elastic and inelas-
tic with respect to risk and market factors. In any case,
they illustrate the differential impact of HGSF on prices
and output.Food 
Price
D0 D1D
*
Figure 5 Potential impact of HGSF on commune food demand. If farmers are not able to provide the additional food
demanded by HGSF (small supply elasticity – curve
Ss), then most of the effect of HGSF goes into prices
and little impact on output. From a welfare
perspective, producer surplus increases (farmers
win), while consumer surplus may decrease
(consumers may lose).
 If farmers provide any additional food demanded by
using current input more intensively and by quickly
changing use of fixed inputs (large supply elasticity
– curve Sl), then HGSF would have a large impactFood 
Price
D0
Pe
S
Figure 6 Illustrative view of the commune food demand
market and HGSF.
Food 
Price
D0
Pe
SsD1
Sl
Figure 7 Potential impacts of HGSF with small and large
supply elasticities.
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welfare perspective producer surplus increases
(farmers win) and consumer surplus increases as
well (consumers win). For the benefit of both
producers and consumers, therefore, a high supply
elasticity is needed.
In general, we should expect the supply elasticity to be
between the two extremes depicted and, therefore, the
programme to have an impact on both prices and out-
put. The impact on prices depends on the level of spatial
market integration. In principle, if markets are efficient,
prices for the same food items should be the same every-
where after an adjustment for transport costs. However,
the literature on market integration suggests that trans-
fer costs may create a wedge between prices at different
locations, which allow prices in the two locations to vary
in an uncorrelated way within a band [11]. In other
words, if transport costs for an isolated commune are
very high, food prices may increase up to a point when
trade between the two locations takes place and prices
are equalised. There is, therefore, a real possibility that
food prices increase at the commune level and that these
price effects are transmitted to consumers.
Based on this theoretical model, the programme will
have a positive impact on farmers’ income via an in-
crease in prices and food quantities produced. The im-
pact on consumers is less obvious. Depending on the
size of the increase in prices, some households may have
their welfare reduced as a result of the intervention. This
observation suggests that the evaluation in addition to
assessing impact on farmers’ income should also moni-
tor price levels and model, by simulations, if notobservations, their impact on consumers. Note also that
the intervention will have other minor positive effects at
the village level by creating additional employment
(cooks, treasurers and stock keepers) and demand. This
suggests that a micro-simulation at the village level
should be conducted in order to assess the potential im-
pact through general equilibrium effects.
The programme also has a distributional impact as it
shifts demand from large to small farmers. As described
in earlier sections, even if households are fully substitut-
ing the school meal, the programme generates a demand
shift from large to small farmers. While small local
farmers see an increase in their income, larger farmers
suffer a reduction. This effect can be observed to the ex-
tent that the evaluation will be able to collect income
data from a large number of farmers, with and without
the programme, large and small.
Finally, the programme potentially reduces household
risk. The programme can stabilise small farmers’ incomes
by offering a stable demand and price. A number of posi-
tive effects follow from risk reduction, including an in-
crease in expected utility, a reduction in the use of
inefficient mitigating and coping strategies, (such as lower
yielding crops and precautionary savings), and an increase
in productive investments. This impact can be observed
indirectly by observing farmers’ risk-mitigating and coping
behaviours. However, it is quite possible that yield risk
dominates price risk. In addition, whatever the price
effects, these may take a long time before having an im-
pact on farmers’ expectations. The programme’s impact
on risk behaviour, therefore, is unlikely to be large.
It is less obvious that a stabilisation of income variability
at the aggregate level is needed or is an obstacle to the im-
plementation of the programme. According to an USDA
report [6], the success of HGSF initiatives in Mali is po-
tentially compromised by the insufficiency and instability
of food production in the aggregate, by the inability of vul-
nerable regions and areas to produce food in the desired
quantity and at the desired time, and by the inability of
farmers to respond to the incentives provided by the pro-
ject. Our analysis of the Food and Agriculture Organisa-
tion (FAO) data on aggregate cereal production in Mali
over the period 1961 to 2007 suggests that, at current
growth rates, by the year 2017 agricultural production in
the country will be sufficient to bring malnutrition below
5% of the total population (see Figures 8 and 9). It is also
clear that cereal production has not only dramatically
increased from the mid-80s but has also become more
stable, accompanied with reduction in undernutrition
rates during the same period.
The sufficiency and stability of the food supply in the
aggregate may hide seasonal stress, regional differences
and the presence of chronically poor groups. However, in
each village, the pool of farmers from which the project
50
0
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Figure 8 Cereal production in Mali 1960 to 2007; Source: Data
from FAO.
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will be traditionally surplus farmers who in the absence of
the programme would sell to traders. Two other factors
may facilitate a stable supply of food at the community
level. First, the involvement of the community-based or-
ganisation in the management of the intervention will
help the identification of farmers able to provide food at
the desired time and in the desired amounts. Second,
following a model adopted by the Purchase for Progress
programme of the WFP, purchases may be organised
through contracts with farmers’ associations rather than
with individual farmers, thus increasing the likelihood of
providing a stable supply.
Impact on education
We formulate hypotheses regarding the impact of school
feeding on child schooling and learning starting from an
economic model of parental educational choices in
developing countries adapted from [12]. Figure 10 below
illustrates the determinants of schooling and learning.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
malnourished trend
Figure 9 Malnutrition in Mali from 1961 to 2007; Source:
Calculated from FAO data.Schooling produces learning, which in turn has welfare
effects. Schooling can be thought of as enrolment, attend-
ance, drop-out or school completion. Learning is the acquir-
ing of basic skills, such as language and mathematics. These
skills are valued in the markets and educated children are
expected to generate higher incomes and wages. In addition,
more educated individuals may conduct healthier lives.
In this model, the main determinants of schooling and
learning are child characteristics, schooling costs,
households’ characteristics and school quality. Cognitive
ability and motivation facilitate learning and encourage
families to send children to school. Children do not partici-
pate in schooling for various reasons; at the household
level, it is often a trade-off between the costs and benefits
of schooling that determine whether a child will go to
school or not. Costs are not only direct, such as school
fees. For example, the opportunity cost of sending a child
to school would mean foregoing the benefits of any work
that the child could be doing instead of attending school.
Often, the opportunity costs follow seasonal patterns, or
increase with age, meaning that older children might need
stronger incentives than younger children in order to stay
in school. The opportunity costs of schooling may also be
higher for girls - girls are often kept at home to look after
siblings, help with other work, or simply for cultural
reasons. These costs have a direct effect on schooling but
should not affect learning. Household characteristics such
as income and preferences (including attitudes towards
education, and time discounting) affect schooling directly,
while other characteristics may affect learning directly (for
example, more educated parents may improve learning by
helping children with their homework). School quality
affects learning directly through the quality of the teaching,
the teaching environment (supplies and facilities) and
schooling, by affecting household schooling decisions.
An initial outcome that drives increased school partici-
pation is the incentive to households to send children to
school. Generally, this incentive is achieved through an in-
come transfer offsetting the financial and opportunity
costs of schooling, and also through an enhancement of
the services provided at school. School feeding may also
have an incentive effect on pupils actually wanting to go
to school to receive food rather than staying at home and
missing out. In theory, both of these effects will contribute
to shift short-term household decisions towards increased
schooling. The specific effect of the incentive will very
much depend on the context in which school feeding is
operating. Conceptually, the health and nutrition
improvements from school feeding can also reinforce the
impact on education. Addressing micronutrient deficien-
cies, in particular iron and iodine, has been shown to have
a positive impact on learning (see Section Impact on nu-
trition), as has the systematic deworming of school-age
children in areas of high prevalence of intestinal
Figure 10 Programme theory of impact on education. The main determinants of schooling and learning are child characteristics, schooling
costs, households’ characteristics and school quality. Children do not participate in schooling for different reasons; at the household level, it is
often a trade-off between the costs and benefits of schooling that determine whether a child will go to school or not.
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improved health and nutrition status resulting from
school feeding service provision would then lead to
improved access and learning outcomes.
Learning increases as a result of schooling. In addition,
the same factors affecting parents’ decisions also affect
learning directly. In this model, school feeding affects
schooling and learning in two ways:
 School meals reduce financial and opportunity costs
of schooling and, therefore, increase schooling
directly, which in turn affects learning positively.
 School meals increase cognitive ability. This in turn
increases child learning in school and affects parents’
schooling decisions (learning increases expected
income and, therefore, parents’ interest in schooling).
Note that the reduction in school costs can be partially
outweighed by additional programme costs. In particular,
the programme may require community participation in
two ways [1,8,9]. First, communities are sometimes
required to provide fire-wood for cooking and other
items such as fresh fruit, vegetables and condiments
[14]. In addition, they are expected to provide cooks and
storekeepers (though participants in these activities often
receive compensation in the form of a daily meal). Second,the CGS may collect contributions from parents either in
monetary form or in-kind. All these contributions increase
the costs of schooling.5
There may also be feedbacks from increased schooling
and learning to school quality. First, learning in school
may increase because the average cognitive ability of
pupils has increased (peer effect) or because teachers be-
come more motivated to teach. Second, cost reduction
may bring to school children of poorer background thus
reducing the average cognitive ability and reducing the
overall performance via the same peer effects. Third,
schools may become overcrowded because of increased
attendance, though the effects of crowded classrooms on
learning are still unclear [15].
Impact on nutrition
School feeding interventions can potentially have an im-
pact on nutritional status of school children and their
younger siblings, as summarised in Figure 11.
a) The nutritional impact is mediated by the extent of
food substitution effects within the household, and the
use of the energy intake by the child and her siblings.
b)The reduction in malnutrition via diet diversification
and the absorption of micronutrients in the body can
have direct effects on cognition.
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learn while in class and outside class.
These three issues will now be discussed:
a. Substitution effectsFig
ho
ab
ouBuilding on [17,18], we provide a simplified
programme theory of the nutritional impact of
school feeding. The school meal can be shared by
children with other household members or can
substitute (at least partly) for food normally
consumed in the home. This is obvious in the case of
take-home-rations, whereby children take home a
quantity of food on a regular basis, but also applies to
any school feeding programme, because households
may in principle use the school meal as a substitute
for food normally consumed and spend the monetary
equivalent otherwise. Evaluations of fortified biscuit
programmes in Bangladesh and Indonesia found that
gains in nutritional intake were not limited to the
children actually receiving the biscuits at school. The
two studies found significant evidence that school
children shared the biscuits with their younger sisters
or brothers at home. A recent randomised control
trial (RCT) in Burkina Faso also found that take-
home-ration programmes led to an improvement ofure 11 Programme theory of impact on nutrition. The nutritional impact
usehold, and the use of the energy intake by the child and her siblings. The r
sorption of micronutrients in the body can have direct effects on cognition. B
tside class.the nutritional status of younger siblings in
beneficiary households [19]. In Uganda, an RCT also
found significant improvements for pre-schooler
siblings of children receiving school feeding [20]. This
provides emerging evidence of a spill-over effect and a
window of opportunity to also affect children during a
critical developmental stage when nutritional
interventions can have the strongest impact.
Ingested foods contribute to three outcomes, of
which physical growth is only one:
 Physical growth. Food can help physical growth in
terms of height and weight. It is normally believed
that catching-up by stunted children after the age
of five is limited. However, food intake should
increase storage of fat and, therefore, weight.
 Physical Activity Level (PAL). Energy intake is spent
in work after school or in more activity and play.
 Basal Metabolic Rate (BMR). Energy is required to
maintain the healthy functioning of the body while
at rest.
Catch-up growth in children and adolescent may be
possible though the process is slower than catch-up
in weight and it is not certain up to what age it takes
place (probably up to the end of the adolescent
growth spurt) [21]. All malnutrition indicators couldis mediated by the extent of food substitution effects within the
eduction in malnutrition via diet diversification and the
etter nourished children may learn better while in class and
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underweight), though the impact will depend on the
extent of substitution effects and on whether
children are increasing the use of energy for PAL and
BMR. A child may have normal height and weight
and still be undernourished because he does not
expend enough energy in activity and play to
maintain health and develop his cognitive abilities.
Assessment of malnutrition should also measure PAL,
particularly in adolescents who engage in considerable
work and play. Unfortunately, there is no accepted
theory, nor evidence, on whether children adapt to
nutritional stress by reducing weight or PAL. There is
also uncertainty on the definition of a minimum
acceptable level of PAL (an arbitrary factor of 1.5 of
BMR is often used by FAO, for example). Finally, there
is no standardised way to measure PAL. Observation
of behaviour in class and questionnaires for parents
and teachers could be used to measure PAL.
Finally, highly deprived children may use additional
energy intake from school meals simply to restore the
original BMR. In addition, higher weight requires more
energy; therefore, BMR is a function of body weight and
the BMR requirement increases as weight increases.
Because of the complex pathways described in this
section, we should not expect a strong impact of the
programme on the nutritional status of children.
However, we might expect an improvement in children’s
activity and play and an improvement in nutritional
status of siblings (if substitution effects are strong).
b.Diet diversification, micronutrients and cognition
Micronutrients may have a direct impact on
cognitive abilities. It is not well understood how iron
affects brain functioning and the central nervous
system, but there is ample evidence that reduction in
iron deficiency improves mental functions across all
age groups [22,23]. Iron interventions were found to
have a positive impact on infant development scales,
intelligence quotient (IQ) tests and school
achievement.
c. Indirect effects of better nutrition on cognition
Restoration of micronutrient requirements and
energy intake can also have an impact on attention
and motivation. Energy intake [24] and iron intake
[22] can have an impact on hyperactivity, withdrawal,
nervousness, hostile behaviour and happiness. The
emotional status of children affects the attention
span and has other spill-over effects. The quality of
teaching in class is likely to be affected as teacher
may become more motivated and as the quality ofstudents performance in class improves (think of the
different impact on learning of improving attention
of 10%, 50% or 100% of students in class).Role of social accountability
The effectiveness of the programme could be considerably
improved by improving the communication mechanisms
between the actors involved, by strengthening the mon-
itoring system, and by introducing elements of social ac-
countability. On the institutional side, the introduction of
a monitoring system and the creation of communication
mechanisms between the different actors would likely
have the effect of improving the programme performance
(see Figure 12). Similar effects could be expected from a
stronger engagement of the CGSs. The delegation of cer-
tain responsibilities to the CGSs could increase motivation
and awareness of the programme among beneficiaries
while at the same time ensuring a better implementation
of activities, (such as monitoring of public officers’ per-
formance and food procurement from small holders in
the community). These effects would have a positive
impact on all the intermediate and final outcomes of
the intervention.
Main hypotheses and outcome indicators
We summarise here the expected impact of the interven-
tion on education, nutrition and social protection discussed
in Section Programme theory of the intervention.
 The intervention will have an impact on a small
number of farmers in the intervention villages.
Other persons in the village may benefit either
directly or indirectly via an increase in income.
 The intervention will have a positive impact on
enrolment, attendance and drop-out rates.
 The intervention will have an impact on cognitive
abilities and class behaviour, including attention.
 The impact on learning (test scores) will be
moderate as school quality is unlikely to change in
the short term.
 The intervention will have a limited impact on
physical growth of children because of the increase
in PAL, substitution effects and the age range (6 to
17 years) of the targeted population. An impact on
siblings of school-going children is possible if
substitution effects are strong.
 The intervention will have a moderate impact on
the diet because food purchases by communities and
mayors do not follow nutritional guidelines and
nutrition education is absent.
 The intervention will have little or no impact on
micronutrient status as the food provision is not
fortified and only moderate effects on diet diversity
are expected.
Institutional strength Monitoring
Communication and 
feed-back
Community 
engagement and skills
Social accountability
Motivation and 
awareness
Programme 
performance
Figure 12 Impact of institutional and community strengthening on programme performance.
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through the introduction of social accountability
mechanisms and the strengthening of the
monitoring and communication system.
Table 2 includes a list of the main outcome indicators
of the study. Section Methods of analysis will describe
how data will be collected using different survey
instruments. All outcomes, including school attendance
and test scores, will be obtained at the household level.
Note that in addition to outcome indicators we will also
observe the programme impact on intermediate indicators,
particularly for those outcomes that are more difficult to ob-
serve directly: income and social accountability. In the case
of income, we will look at intermediate outcome, such as in-
put use (labour, land, seeds and fertiliser), investments (farm
capital such as tools and machinery), and market access
(marketed surplus, prices and markets). In the case of social
accountability, we will observe the impact of the programme
on knowledge and practices of mayors and CGSs members
as they result from the training activities. The quantity, qual-
ity and timely preparation and delivery of food in school will
also be examined.
Design of the randomized evaluation
The national school feeding programme will be
expanded in the regions of Mopti, Koulikoro and Kayes.
These areas are among the most vulnerable of the coun-
try and offer a diversity of agro-climatic conditions and
cropping patterns. Areas that are inaccessible for mostTable 2 Main outcome indicators of the intervention
Indicator
Income
Distributional effects
Schooling
Attention
Learning achievements
Physical growth
Diet diversity
Social accountabilityof the year or in which there are serious security
concerns were excluded from the study. The Ministry of
Education has set clear criteria for the selection of the
intervention areas. Priority is given to areas of food inse-
curity and vulnerability, poor enrolment rates (particu-
larly of girls), poor presence of donors and of high
community involvement. Similarly, criteria for the selec-
tion of schools include: schools with poor retention and
completion rates (particularly of girls); schools with chil-
dren from nomad and destitute families; schools with
children with special needs; schools where one-third of
class has to travel at least 3 km to reach the school;
schools demanding canteens.
The impact evaluation is an integral component of the
monitoring and evaluation activities of the national school
feeding programme. The baseline survey is planned in inter-
vention and control sites in 2012 and a follow-up is planned
in 2014. By 2015 the control schools and community will be
fully integrated in the intervention. We will consider the pos-
sibility of conducting further surveys in the following years
building matched control groups in order to detect long
term effects of the intervention on farmers’ productivity.
We discuss here two main elements of the evaluation
approach: random assignment and manipulation of
treatment; and threats to validity.Random assignment and manipulation of treatments
The evaluation will measure outcomes at the child,
household and school level. Households and schools willMetric
Farm profits
Small farmers participating in the programme
Enrolment, attendance, and completion
Digit span or other test
Scores on language and math tests
Anthropometric measures of height and weight
Household consumption
Parental monitoring and motivation
Table 3 Summary of sample sizes
Communes Schools Households Farmers Children1
Control 58 58 870 290 2,700
HGSF 29 29 435 290 1,500
HGSF+ 29 29 435 290 1,500
TOTAL 58 116 1,740 870 5,700
Note: 1) the number of children in an estimate based on an average of 2
children per family in families with children and 1.5 children per family in
farmer households.
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ment arms are envisaged:
1) Control group. These are schools and households
from villages where the intervention will not be
implemented. The intervention will be delayed by at
least two years in these villages, preferably without
informing schools and households.
2) Regular school feeding programme group. These are
schools and villages where the standard Government
programme is implemented, with mayors responsible
for the food procurement.
3) Home grown school feeding and social accountability
group (HGSF±). These are schools and villages
where the programme is implemented in addition to
a capacity building component, including training of
community-based organisations and local
government on food procurement, nutrition
education and feedback monitoring.
Note that in the intervention areas, as per the selection
protocol, one school would be linked to one village. Fur-
thermore, two schools in two villages would be selected in
each commune. The HGSF+ intervention is conducted
at the commune level. Training and monitoring systems
involve mayors and exert their effects at the commune
level, affecting outcomes in schools where the HGSF+
programme is not implemented. On the other hand,
the number of communes where the programme is
implemented is rather small, which reduces the statistical
power of the analysis, and the effect of the school feeding
intervention against the control group are best observed
at the school level. Hence, we opted for a design that
compares outcomes of school feeding versus a control
group at the school level, and that compares outcomes of
HGSF+ versus regular school feeding at the commune
level. The MOE selected 58 out of the 170 most vulner-
able communes in the country where the programme will
be implemented. In each of these communes, mayors then
selected two schools with similar characteristics that are
eligible for the programme. Each school was then ran-
domly assigned either to the treatment or to the school
feeding intervention. A protocol was designed in order to
ensure that contamination between the two schools in
each commune was avoided. This will allow comparison
of outcomes of the school feeding intervention against the
control group at the school level in 58 communes. A sec-
ond level randomisation involved randomly assigning the
intervention schools in the 58 communes to either the
regular school feeding or HGSF+ (or school feeding plus
the enhanced training package) treatment groups. In prac-
tice, the randomisation of the HGSF+ intervention oc-
curred using restricted randomisation at the commune
level [25]. To ensure balance in the comparison groups,the random allocation of communes to school feeding or
HGSF+ was undertaken by modelling pilot selection using
a set of community and district level variables, testing
1,000 random allocations and selecting the permutation
that minimises the R2 for the predicted selection [26].
Power calculations (see Appendix 1 for more details)
and resource availability suggested the adoption of a
sample of 25 households from the village areas of the 58
schools receiving the intervention and of 20 households
in the village areas of the 58 control schools. Farmers
will be oversampled in both areas in the following way:
10 out of the 25 households in the 58 intervention
villages will be farmer households and 5 out of the 20
households in the 58 control villages will be farmer
households. This distribution of the sample between
farmers and non-farmer households and between project
control groups allows the construction of comparable
samples (see Table 3).
Households were randomly selected in the catchment
areas of the selected schools for the survey interviews.6
The definition of ‘household’ in Mali is not straightfor-
ward as many families share the same living compound
and polygamous families are common. A recent study
[27] found that adding descriptions to a “restricted” def-
inition of household (a group of people who normally
live in your household – adopted by the DHS) increases
the number of adult male members reported during the
interview. This, however, does have a very limited impact
on household characteristics, such as per capita food
consumption, assets and agricultural production. We
recommend the use of the restricted definition adopted
by the Rapid Household Survey 2006, which reflects the
LSMS experience in collecting data in developing coun-
tries. According to this definition, a (restricted) house-
hold is a group of people who normally live and eat
together. Members spending less than three months
with the household within a year should be excluded.
Families living in the same compound should be
considered as different (restricted) households, though
the consumption section of the questionnaire was care-
fully designed in order to take into account the common
use of food resources. Polygamous households were
treated as distinct households if wives live and cook in
separate houses.
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conducted via a previous census as this was considered
too costly in terms of time and resources. We opted for
interviewing village chiefs and building a list of enlarged
households in the villages covered by the sample school.
The listing also included an approximation of the size of
the enlarged households. In addition, a number of
farmer households was oversampled in each village.
Chiefs (and members of the CGSs) were asked to list
which farmers they would contact if they were to pur-
chase food within the village for the provision of school
meals. This latter information was used to single out the
surplus farmers in the area (up to 10 in the project
villages and up to 5 in the control villages that will be
interviewed).
Enlarged households were randomly selected (with in-
clusion probability proportional to size) from the list
provided by the village chiefs, and listings of the
restricted households within each selected enlarged
households will then be developed through interviews
with household heads. A restricted household with chil-
dren aged 5 to 15 was then randomly selected within
each selected enlarged non-farmer household, and we
estimate that each household will have at least two chil-
dren in this age group. A similar selection procedure
was used for farmer households when these exceed the
numbers of 10 and 5 in the project and control villages,
respectively. In farmer households though, no age cri-
teria were used and the household was identified around
the main agricultural holding unit of the enlarged house-
hold. This consists of the family members involved in
the main production unit (land and livestock) in the
enlarged household.Table 4 Threats to internal validity
Indicator Metric Spill-over and cont
Schooling Enrolment, attendance,
drop-out and completion
Children may attend school fr
communities to have access t
Cognitive
ability
Raven’s matrices or other
test
Very unlikely
Attention Digit span or other test Very unlikely
Learning
achievement
Scores on language and
math tests
Very unlikely
Physical
growth
Anthropometric measures of
height and weight
Children from other villages m
meals
PAL Parents perceptions Very unlikely
Diet diversity Household consumption Very unlikely
Micronutrient
intake
Iron status, anaemia Children from other villages m
meals
Income Farm profits Unlikely, if food purchases are
villages
Social
accountability
Parental monitoring and
motivation
None at household level, poss
Government levelThreats to validity
The main potential threats to the internal validity of the
study, including contamination, spill-over effects and
Hawthorne-like effects were examined for each of the
outcome indicators of Section Programme theory of the
intervention. From Table 4 it seems that most threats
could be avoided by:
i. assigning treatments to communes rather than to
villages within communes in order to avoid
contamination effects;
ii. avoid informing teachers and households of the control
villages that the programme will be implemented after
two years in order to avoid expectancy effects;
iii. adopting strategies in conducting cognitive and
achievement tests that prevent teachers and children
from over-performing.
Given the panel structure of the data there is a poten-
tial risk of differential attrition. However, it is difficult to
predict why households or farmers from the control
groups should respond to the interviews in different
ways. Refusal to take part in the interview by households
not benefiting from the project seems to be the main
threat. However, as shown in the table above, the project
has limited impact on household expectations in both
project and control groups and, therefore, should have
limited impact on response rates.
One issue with impact on cognitive development is
that the observed impact can be the result of:
 Increased attention in school resulting from the
energy meal (short term effect)amination Hawthorne and placebo effects
om neighbouring
o meals
Expectation of coming programme in control
villages
Teachers’ and children’s attempts to over-perform
in both project and control villages
Teachers’ and children’s attempts to over-perform
in both project and control villages
Teachers’ and children’s attempts to over-perform
in both project and control villages
ay access school Very unlikely
Very unlikely
Very unlikely
ay access school Very unlikely
made in control Very unlikely
ible at local Possible
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protracted school feeding, school attendance, play time,
social interactions . . .and so on. . . (long term effect)
A recent systematic review of school feeding
interventions [26] observed that most evaluations have
not been able to distinguish the two effects. This could
be achieved through careful design of the intervention
as the one shown in Table 5. Half of the project children
are not given the meal on the day of the test until after
the test, while half of the control children are given the
meal before the test. The differences across columns (a-c
and b-d) should produce the long term effect, while the
differences across rows (a-b and c-d) should produce the
short term effect. This approach will possibly be tested
as a case study in a sub-sample of schools.
Survey instruments
The impact evaluation will include household, school,
farmer, village and commune level data collection.
Household questionnaire: This will collect data at the
household level and for each household member
separately.
The household questionnaire will include the following
modules:
◦Household roster (main demographic characteristics,
including those of children residing elsewhere)
◦ Education (school attendance, education of all household
members, time spent in class and working, distance and
transport to school, meals while in school, parents’
aspirations, PTA membership and involvement)
◦Household assets and farm assets (household facilities
and durables, including land and livestock holdings)
◦ Economic activities (simple income questionnaire on
time spent working by household members in wage
work, own business and own farm)
◦ Expenditure (monetary expenditure and own
production of food, education, health, durables and
non-food expenditure)
◦Anthropometry (height and weight of parents and
children above six months of age – parents’
measurements are taken to assess the genetic potential)
◦ Cognitive and achievement tests (test scores on math,
language and digit span test),Table 5 Teasing out short-term and long-term impact on
cognitive development
Meal No meal
Project a b
Control c d◦ Farm income (agricultural production and revenues,
input expenditure and depreciation of farm assets)
◦Other income (a simplified income questionnaire for
other income sources like microenterprises, transfers,
remittances, gifts and so on)
School questionnaire: In each school a questionnaire
will be administered to head teachers and teachers, and
will include the following modules:
◦ School facilities (school characteristics including boards,
toilets, furniture, books and all school-feeding related
characteristics – kitchen, storage room and so on)
◦ School participation (school-level data on enrolment,
attendance and drop-out)
◦ School management and food procurement
◦ Teachers (qualifications, living conditions and
aspirations)
◦ Training and monitoring activities
Mayors’ questionnaires: Mayors will be interviewed in
each of the 58 communes at the baseline and at the
endline. The purpose of the questionnaire is two-fold.
First, it will collect information at the village level that
will be used in the multivariate analysis when analysing
the project outcomes at the household level. Second,
some project outcomes, for example, the number of
small farmers involved in the project, will be observed
through this instrument. The tool will include the
following modules:
◦ Funding of school canteens (instalments received and
payments made)
◦ Food deliveries (quantities and characteristics of
delivery to each school)
◦ Food procurement (details of all procurement over the
calendar year)
◦Monitoring and supervision (supervision of correct
procurement and deliveries)
◦Knowledge and practices (training and knowledge acquired)
An operations manual, including guidelines for the sur-
vey data collection was developed as part of the baseline
survey training materials. The manual included back-
ground information on the survey activities, module by
module guidance on the different survey tools, as well as
specific guidance on the anthropometry measurements.
Other relevant research
Complementary qualitative research will be conducted
in three areas: tracking expenditure survey; parental
perceptions of schooling; and assessment of programme
characteristics that cannot be observed through standard
surveys.
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As the national programme is relatively new and in the
process of scaling-up, there might be inefficiencies or
leakages in the flow of funds running from the Ministry
of Finance down to the school management committees.
We suggest conducting research following the flow of
funding from its initial allocation at the central level,
to the regional offices, the mayors, the CGSs and the
traders or small farmers involved. The research will
allow a careful examination of all the stages of the finan-
cial transactions involved, highlighting the characteristics
of the procurement system and identifying entry points
for improved efficiency.
Focus groups with farmers, parents, children, teachers and
local authority stakeholders
These focus groups are designed to obtain insights on
the challenges and opportunities in terms of engaging
small holder farmers in the food procurement process,
determinants of parents’ and children’s decisions to at-
tend school, as well as related issues linked to hunger
and seasonality. Teacher attitudes and motivation will
also be assessed. The focus groups will be conducted in
a small sub-sample of communes/schools at baseline, at
mid-term and during the follow-up survey.
Programme monitoring and process analysis
Survey data collection will be integrated in the regular
project monitoring activities also supported by PCD that
include school level monthly and quarterly data collec-
tion. Periodic visits (in some cases unannounced) will
also be made to the project communities in order to ob-
serve nutritional characteristics of the meal served in
school; pupils’ behaviour in class after the meals; modal-
ities of cooking and storage; other aspects of project im-
plementation that cannot be observed though a
quantitative survey.
Methods of analysis
The analysis will follow the intention to treat approach
as protocol and as treated, using econometric and simu-
lation analysis, for all the relevant outcomes of the inter-
vention. Impact will be assessed for the different
treatment arms using regression analysis to account for
potential confounding variables, using a “difference-in
-difference” estimator.
As enrolment rates in Mali are very low in rural areas
(around 30%), one problem in conducting this analysis is
that school feeding may bring to school children of very
poor backgrounds with poor nutritional status and cogni-
tive abilities to start with. This problem can be overcome
econometrically by controlling for such confounders dur-
ing the data analysis.A further difficulty of difference-in-difference analysis is
serial correlation [28] resulting from unobserved factors
affecting the outcomes that are themselves correlated over
time and that produce auto-correlated errors and invalid
standard errors. Serial correlation affects estimated standard
errors and can lead to erroneous acceptance or rejection of
null hypotheses but not the estimation of the effect size of
the intervention. Thus, it may lead to erroneously finding
or not finding a statistically significant impact of the inter-
vention. See [29] for an illustration of how this problem can
be addressed by calculating clustered standard errors, a pro-
cedure that is easily implemented using the Stata software.
Clustered standard errors will also be employed in all cases
in which correlated outcomes are observed within the same
unit of analysis, for example, when the impact of the inter-
vention is analysed at the school level and test scores within
the school are obviously correlated. Similarly, clustered
standard error will be used at the household level when the
project is affecting more than one child within the same
family as in the case of the impact on siblings that was
discussed in Section Impact on nutrition.
Markets
We are not aware of studies of market integration in
Mali. The Observatoire du Marche Agricole (OMA)
collects agricultural prices on a weekly basis from more
than 50 locations around the country. In principle, their
data could be used to assess the extent of market inte-
gration, but not having access to the data we will assume
in the following that markets are not fully integrated. If
markets of staple foods (millet, sorghum and rice) are
not fully integrated, prices can vary from one location to
the other and the additional demand introduced by the
project may have a positive impact on prices.
There are several markets of producer and consumer
prices along the supply chain of staple foods. These
markets are linked by complex relations and involve sev-
eral actors: producers, collectors, bulkers, traders, retailers
and consumers. The markets where the programme may
have an impact are the foire (village, or group of villages,
level market), the bulker market and the retailer markets.
Foire markets in particular are markets where foods are
purchased from local farmers by collectors and where
local consumers make their purchases. If the project has
an impact on prices it is likely to occur at this level. In
practice, the impact on prices can happen a maximum of
three times per year when purchases by the mayors are
made and only in the HGSF+ programme sites.
Impact on prices could in principle be observed
through the household level questionnaires. The farm
gate price could be observed at the household level by
including in the questionnaire questions related to prices
paid and time of sales. This, however, would compli-
cate the income section of the farmer questionnaire.
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standard household survey because the recall time is 7
or 30 days and there is only one survey per year.
As part of the programme monitoring activities, price
data will be collected on a monthly basis for millet, sor-
ghum and rice in the local foire next to each of the
selected schools. The work could be assisted by the
OMA through the provision of training given its long
experience in the field. Collection of prices does not
even require visits to markets if stable contacts can be
established with collectors in each of the markets and
prices could be communicated by phone.
Other general equilibrium effects
There is a possibility that some of the outcomes of the
programme cannot be observed because of the type of
intervention and the sampling design. In particular, the
programme is likely to benefit only a few farmers in each
of the project villages and the number of project villages
for the study may not be sufficient to perform project-
control comparisons that are statistically significant. In
addition, there is a risk of large fluctuations within the
trial period, which would tend to increase the variability
in the outcomes and process measures – and, hence, pos-
sibly fatally undermine the power of the study due to this
increased variability. We developed two strategies to miti-
gate this risk. The first involved the design of the study:
we worked with Ministry of Agriculture technical
stakeholders to spread the intervention area across a
broad range of agro-ecological zones across the country.
More importantly though, we devised an analysis strategy
that includes two different simulations of the potential im-
pact: The first is a micro-simulation of the farm-level im-
pact of the intervention. Using household data we can
estimate production and profit functions and then simu-
late the impact on farmers’ income, factoring in the add-
itional demand and changes in food prices. Changes in
prices can be simulated or observed directly through
surveys. Similarly, the impact on consumption can be
simulated after the estimation of a consumption function
using household data. The second exercise consists of a
village level simulation using a computable general equi-
librium model. In this case, data are collected in one or
two villages in order to build a social accounting matrix
(SAM) to be used to simulate the impact of the injection
of liquidity in the village economy. The advantage of this
approach is that it allows the simulation of the impact on
the entire community via price and demand effects. This
method could also be used to simulate the differential im-
pact of the programme in a drought and in a surplus year.
Heterogeneity of impact
Gender, age and geographic area are other relevant cat-
egories to analyse impact. The impacts of school feedingin different contexts are quite heterogeneous [30].
School feeding, for instance, has been associated with
marked improvements in school participation of girls in
rural areas with large gender disparities in access to edu-
cation [31]. Small-holder farmers targeted by the pro-
gram will in large proportions be women. From the
educational perspective, school feeding impact has also
been found to vary with pupil age, as household
schooling decisions are also affected by the opportunity
costs of education, that tend to change with gender and
increasingage and [32].
The programme is targeted to disadvantaged groups.
Main beneficiaries are:
 Children aged 6 to 17 attending primary school
 Poor, rural districts of the country
 Smallholder farmer households
The programme has a potential poverty inequality re-
duction impact at the national level. At the local level it
has a potential poverty reduction impact, but the in-
equality reduction impact will depend on whether:
 The project will increase enrolment. Children going
to school are likely to be from richer background
and more accessible areas.
 The project will involve small farmers. The
programme might rely on large farmers or traders
for the provision of food.
Cost effectiveness
Cost data will be collected retrospectively following an
ingredients approach using a semi-structured question-
naire. The survey will be based on a standardised costing
framework capturing capital (fixed) and recurrent costs
incurred at the school level. The questionnaire will also
cover both cash and in-kind contributions and will be
used to estimate both financial and economic costs. Fi-
nancial costs capture actual expenditures in terms of
programme implementation on an annual basis. Eco-
nomic costs included the opportunity costs of commu-
nity members, teaching staff and other school level
stakeholders involved in the school feeding service
provision. Opportunity costs of the school staff and
community members will be calculated using local pay
scales. Capital costs will be annuitized over the useful
life of all relevant school level assets using a discount
rate of 3% as per World Bank recommendations.
Annuitisation enables an equivalent annual cost to be
estimated and reflects the value in-use of capital items,
rather than reflecting when the item was purchased [33].
Process and output data covering the adequacy of the
service delivery will be collected from monitoring visits
on a quarterly basis using standardised data collection
Table 6 Attendance rates for the 7 to 12 and 13 to 15 age groups in rural Mali (calculated from DHS, 2006)
Primary (age group 7 to 12) Lower secondary (age group 13 to 15) Age group 7 to 15
All 35.6 33.8 35.1
Male 39.1 39.9 39.3
Female 32.1 27.4 30.8
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provide estimates of cost-efficiency metrics, including
costs per beneficiary, kilocalories, iron and vitamin A
delivered. Sensitivity analysis will be undertaken to ac-
count for uncertainties in the economic evaluation. The
figures obtained in this way will then be compared to
figures calculated for other interventions.
Of particular interest is the cost-effectiveness of the
community level/social accountability component of the
intervention. The comparison between the HGSF+ and
the regular GSFP is roughly equivalent to the compari-
son between a home grown school feeding project and a
standard school feeding project. Many would expect
HGSF to be cheaper and more cost effective because of
lower transport costs. However, the alternative procure-
ment source, its distance and affordability is unknown,
and hence the difference in costs between the two
programmes is an empirical question.
Risks
Overall, the study involves very low risks for participants.
The risks are related to the quality of the food service
delivered by the national school feeding programme. Risks
involve food hygiene, sanitation and preparation related
issues. There is also a risk associated with the potential
disruption in the service delivery that could undermine
the potential impact. If parents believe a child is fed in
school when in fact the food service is not functioning,
then the child can be potentially worse off after the inter-
vention, though possibly just for one or a few days. The
study will examine these risks in detail and also identify
and test strategies to minimize these risks operationally.
Ethical clearance
Ethical clearance was obtained from the appropriate
boards in Mali and at Imperial College, London. Meetings
were held from the early stages in the study developmentTable 7 Summary table of values used in the power calculatio
Enrolment
Alpha 0.05
N (observations) 55
J (schools) 2
K (clusters) 58
Intra Cluster Correlation -
Between sites variability -with relevant Government Ministries both at central and
decentralised levels to discuss the purpose, procedures
and risks involved in the study. Informed consent was
obtained from parents/guardians of children through writ-
ten and verbal information provided before interviews.
Trial oversight
The evaluation team will be guided by a steering group,
including the Government of Mali’s coordination frame-
work on school feeding, and the Ministry of Education
and Ministry of Agriculture. An independent steering
group of experts in evaluation, public health, agriculture
and education provided peer reviews prior to the data
collection and will be convened at completion of the
study to approve the final data analysis plan.
Discussion
National Governments in sub-Saharan Africa have
demonstrated strong leadership in the response to the re-
cent food and financial crises by scaling-up school feeding
programmes. “Home-grown” school feeding programmes
have the potential to link the increased demand for
school feeding goods and services to community-based
stakeholders, including small-holder farmers and women’s
groups. However, there is a dearth of evidence on the costs
and benefits of school feeding programmes linked to small-
holder agriculture and community development. This evalu-
ation will be the first to examine the impact of linking
school food service provision on small-holder farmer in-
come, as well as the link between community level engage-
ment and programme performance, alongside assessing the
more traditional benefits to school children.
The impact evaluation follows a theory-based ap-
proach and is underpinned by the development of
the programme theory for the intervention. It in-
cludes a process evaluation component that will enable
policymakers to not only understand if the interventionns
Test scores Agricultural income
0.05 0.05
25 10
2 2
58 58
0.15 0.25
0.20 0.40
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using a mixed-method approach, the evaluation will ex-
plore both hard outcomes (for example, enrolment, in-
come, welfare) but also perceptions on softer elements
of programme performance (for example, community
ownership and accountability).
This study will also be the first evaluation designed
around the scale-up of a national school feeding
programme in sub-Saharan Africa. It is a prime oppor-
tunity to provide policy relevant evidence. To ensure
that this was the case, policy makers across Education,
Health, Agriculture and Local Government Ministries
were engaged from the early design stages through to
survey design and implementation. In particular, this
study is anchored in the framework provided by the
Ministry of Education’s recently developed national
school feeding policy. In Mali, the national policy on de-
centralisation also meant that policy makers at regional
and commune level be engaged in design process. A
number of meetings were held to sensitise stakeholders
at the different levels, also including them in the ran-
domisation process.
Conducting this type of research in the Malian context
also raises a number of practical issues, including logis-
tics, security and local political constraints. A set of con-
tingency plans were developed to tackle foreseen
challenges; however, the major upheaval currently taking
place in the country clearly poses a major challenge to
the intervention itself. The scale-up areas, however, re-
main under Government control, and recent news
provides encouraging signs that the work will continue.
Despite these challenges, the study is underway, and the
baseline survey will provide some important new data
on the links between education, health and small-holder
agriculture in food insecure areas of Mali.
Trial status
As of April 2012, the baseline survey for this study is
underway though completion is pending, depending on
the current political unrest in the country.
Appendix 1: Power calculations
The designed adopted by this study consists of (a) a
multi-site cluster randomized trial to detect the impact
of the regular school feeding and HGSF+ intervention
against a control group without school feeding interven-
tion, and of (b) a cluster randomized trial to detect the
impact of the HGSF+ intervention against the regular
school feeding intervention.
Comparing school feeding to no-school feeding (multi-
site cluster randomized trial)
In the multi-site cluster randomized trial the sites are
blocks and clusters are randomly assigned to treatmentand control within each site. In each commune (site),
two schools (clusters) are selected and randomly
assigned to the treatment and the control groups. This is
equivalent to conducting a randomization of schools
stratifying by commune.
There are a total of 58 communes selected for the
intervention and two schools are chosen by local educa-
tion authorities in each commune. In each school/vil-
lage, 25 households will be interviewed. Only families
with children in the age range from 5 to 15 will be
selected, which implies that some 55 children in each
community and a total of more than 6,500 children will
take part to the interviews. The average number of chil-
dren aged 5 to 15 in rural Mali was 2.58 in 2006 based
on the data collected by the DHS. Care will also be taken
to obtain a sizable sample of farmers and potential
providers of staples for school feeding in each village.
We calculate power and minimum detectable effect
size for the following outcomes:
 enrolment rates
 test scores
 farm income
Enrolment
Public education in Mali is compulsory for nine years
from age 7 to age 15 and split in a six-year primary cycle
and a three-year lower secondary cycle. Enrolment rates
in rural areas are very low and lower for girls compared
to boys. Table 6 below reports the attendance rates for
the age groups 7 to 12 and 13 to 15 in rural Mali
calculated from the DHS survey of 2006 (Table 6).
Ahmed [34] found a 14% difference in enrolment rates
between project and control groups in Bangladesh.
Researchers for FAO/WHO [21] found an effect of 6%
in Burkina Faso, Jacoby [35] found a difference of 3% in
Peru, while Buttenheim et al. [36] found no effect in
Laos, mostly due to lack of intervention implementation.
We adopt an increase in attendance rate by five percent-
age points as a minimum expected impact of the
programme. Simulations of power for the percent differ-
ence in enrolment in the project group versus the con-
trol group show that a 5% difference will be detected
with 80% probability, while differences of 10% and 15%
will be detected with certainty. At 80% power, the mini-
mum detectable difference is 5%.
Test scores
Few studies have investigated the impact of school
feeding on learning outcomes. Drèze et al. [32] reviewed
the experimental evidence on the impact of school
feeding on standardised test scores and found an average
standardised effect size of 0.31 for math achievement
tests, while no effect was found on reading tests. We
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intervention on math test scores. Based on the Scrochet
report, the recommended intra-cluster correlation coeffi-
cient for math and reading tests is 0.15. We also assume
that only about half of the children interviewed will be
able to take the test and we set the number of children
tested per village at 25. Simulations of power as a func-
tion of minimum standardised detectable effect show
that a standardised difference of 0.1 would be detected
in 24% of cases, a difference of 0.2 would be detected in
68% of cases and a difference of 0.3 would be detected
in 95% of cases. With power set at 80%, the minimum
detectable difference is 0.23.
Income
No previous studies have investigated the impact of
home-grown school feeding on farmers’ incomes and in-
deed this type of programme is entirely new. In addition,
it is difficult to find programmes with effects similar to
those of school feeding programmes. The Purchase for
Progress programme by the World Food Programme,
which similarly to the Malian school feeding programme
purchases food for local producers, has modelled an in-
crease in income by $50 dollars as a reasonable target
for small African farmers. With a per capita GDP of
$700 this corresponds to 7.5% of the average Malian in-
come, though the income of small farmers is likely to be
less than half the national average income. In addition,
farm income is about 50% of total household income
and the impact of a $50 increase on farm income is
therefore much larger. We adopt 15% and 30% as
minimum detectable effects of the programme on
agricultural incomes of small farmers.
We adopt a conservative estimate of 10 farmers
surveyed in each village, and based on data on agricul-
tural incomes of Ghanaian farmers, we estimated the
intra-class correlation coefficient (ϱ = 0.25) and the vari-
ance explained by site variability (B = 0.40). Note that
given the high value of the standard deviation of income,
similar in size to average income, the standardised differ-
ence and the percentage difference are almost equiva-
lent. The probability of detecting an increase by 15% in
agricultural income is 35% and the probability of
detecting an impact of 30% is 88%. A power of 80% will
be able to detect an income increase by 26%.
Comparing school feeding to HGSF+ (cluster randomized
trial)
To estimate MDES we assume that 58 clusters (schools)
will be randomly assigned to regular school feeding or
HGSF+. Using standard simulations we observe that
 A 5% difference will be detected with 60%
probability, while differences of 10% and 15% will bedetected with certainty. At 80% power the minimum
detectable difference is 6%.
 A standardised difference of 0.1 would be detected
in 15% of cases, a difference of 0.2 would be
detected in 41% of cases and a difference of 0.3
would be detected in 79% of cases. With power set
at 80% the minimum detectable difference is 0.32.
 The probability of detecting an increase by 15% in
agricultural income is 17% and the probability of
detecting an impact of 30% is 50%. A power of 80%
will be able to detect an income increase by 40%.
Conclusions
The power analysis suggests that the study will be able
to detect an increase in enrolment by 5%, a 0.2 differ-
ence in test scores and an increase in farmers’ incomes
by 25% between the school feeding interventions and
the control group. The study will be able to detect
changes in enrolment by 6%, differences in tests scores
by 0.3 and changes in income by 40% between the regu-
lar school feeding and the HGSF+ components of the
intervention see (Table 7).
While the sample size is well suited to the analysis of
programme impact on attendance rates and test scores,
it is clearly insufficient for the analysis of income effects
of the HGSF+ intervention. However, we hope to over-
come this problem in two ways: by increasing statistical
power through restricted randomisation and by focus-
sing on intermediate outcomes rather than on household
income, a variable that has large variance and high
within cluster correlation. First, in order to increase stat-
istical power we will adopt ‘restricted randomisation’
[25]. We will use the baseline data collected at the village
and school levels to remove the randomisation outcomes
that would result in an unbalanced comparison of project
and control communes. The randomisation of the HGSF+
component of the project within the 58 communes will be
performed only within the restricted sample of balanced
randomisation outcomes. Second, we will analyse inter-
mediate indicators of household income such as input use
(labour and other farm inputs, such as land, seeds and fer-
tiliser) and farm capital use like animal traction, tools and
simple machinery.
Endnotes
1 Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics Mali country
profile, 2009.
2 Source: Mali Demographic and Health Survey, 2006.
3 Ibid, MDHS, 2006.
4 Notice that there is a potential nutritional downside
on nutrition following from this. If parents believe a
child is fed in school when he/she is not, then the child
is worse off after the intervention, though possibly just
for one or few days.
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the schooling choice was made entirely by the parents
ignoring the emotional effect of school feeding on chil-
dren. School fed children may become more motivated
and this could lead to higher attendance directly or in-
directly (via parents’ decisions). This suggests that the
model should include the utility function of children,
not just the parents [15].
6 We suggest a random selection of households in the
villages. This approach has also been successfully
adopted, for example, by [22,27]. One additional advan-
tage of this approach is that it allows the identification
of the determinants of enrolment/attendance and pro-
vide estimates of the relative relevance of school cost re-
duction effects produced by the programme.
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